Global trends 2030 –Citizens in an interconnected and polycentric world
Code:
E16
Primary project information
Lead:
European Strategy and Policy AnalysisSystem (ESPAS), Bureau of European Policy Advisors
Additional project partners:
Institute for Security StudiesEuropean Union
Type of activity:
Study on global trends
Date conducted:
2011
Date of Publication:
2011
Duration:
1 YEAR
Summary:
The aim was not to predict how the world will look in 2030 but rather to map major, existing trends that are likely to shape the future and must be taken into account by the European Union in its attempt to define coherent strategic options for the next governance cycle. The research is based on 12 research papers covering six core issues (climate change and natural resources; energy; information technology; economic development; migration; and disarmament) and seven world regions. As its title suggests, the report deals primarily with identifiable trends taking shape across nations and continents rather than focusing on international relations; as befits the normative civilian nature of the EU, the report focuses clearly on the likely evolution of citizens’ rights, demands and expectations, as opposed to adopting the more traditional focus on inter-state relations.
Financed by:
Bureau of European Policy Advisors
Budget:
N/A
Research area/market/industry/sector:
empowerment of the individual; single human community; sustainable development; resource scarcity; consequences of climate change; polycentric world; governance gaps; (6)
Main report (full title):
Global trends 2030 – Citizens in an interconnected and polycentric world
GRAND CHALLENGES
Economic Challenges:
financial crisis of 2008 could have an enduring impact on living standards in Europe (15); current growth model is coming under increasingly critical scrutiny around the world. A central issue for the future is the extent to which the major economic powers of the past fifty years – the US, Europe and Japan – will be capable of reformulating their growth model in a sustainable direction, and building new competitive advantages (16); and the US, creating a category of ‘new poor,’ shrinking the middle class and triggering new migratory flows, as well as a brain drain from impoverished regions in EU countries;
Economic Challenges Shortlist:
Oligopolisitc tendencies of financial secort promote enemic financial instability (67); Ongoing financial instability and equity cises may shock China's financial institutions and derail growths there and beyond; service sector may benefit from growth of globalmiddle class (69); Absolute poverty will diminish over the next two decades, but areas of extreme poverty will remain, potentially entrenching existing gaps between rich and poor (69); The salaries of low-skilled workers in the developed world have been subjected to downward pressure in recent decades by advances in technology and the growth of large emerging markets as low-cost production centres (77); current growth model is coming under increasingly critical scrutiny around the world (16); reformulate growth model toward sustainability (16); new migratory flows, as well as a brain drain from impoverished regions in EU countries;
Geopolitical Challenges:
The focus of long-term strategic planning is on global challenges such as proliferation (including by non-state actors), cyber security or instability emanating from failing states – humanitarian crises, piracy and organised crime – and on the protection of natural resources and access to energy. (17) trouble is most likely to emerge as a result of the China-Vietnam conflict over the disputed islands in the South China Sea; the Indo- Pakistani conflict over Afghanistan; the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara; the problems emerging as a result of the possible collapse of North Korea; and unresolved conflicts in Eastern Europe (17). State fragility and conflict compounded by pervasive and possibly growing income inequality and a massive increase in the urban population will be most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa. Social vulnerabilities will increase the likelihood of strife, and thus reinforce the ‘state fragility-conflict’ cycle. Intra-African and trans-regional forced migration due to economic factors, conflicts and environmental degradation will tend to grow for this reason.(17) Wars fuelled by nationalism and extremist identity politics, and the associated dangers of mass murder and genocide, will be the core security challenge of the coming decades.(17) Polycentrism will be accompanied by an economic power shift toward Asia (18).there will be no single hegemonic world power; that the US and China will be the most influential actors; that India will continue to rise; and that Russia and Japan will lose the great power status they enjoyed in the twentieth century (18). Polycentric world will generate a higher level of unpredictability in international relations,and make it harder to attain a broad consensus even on matters requiring urgent global action (19). Devolution and diffusion of power; By 2030, the fifty greatest megacities in the world will concentrate more resources than most small and middle-income states, and they will demand more autonomy and exert greater power, even taking on a more prominent international role (19). Privatisation of central state functions may lead to breakdown of state structures (19).
Geopolitical Challenges Shortlist:
emanating from failing states: proliferation, cyber security, instability, humanitarian crises, piracy and organised crime, protection of natural resources and access to energy(17); China-Vietnam conflict over the disputed islands in the South China Sea; the Indo- Pakistani conflict over Afghanistan; the conflict between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara; the problems emerging as a result of the possible collapse of North Korea; and unresolved conflicts in Eastern Europe (17); Sub-Saharan state fragility caused by growing income inequality and a massive increase in the urban population (17); Intra-African and trans-regional forced migration due to economic factors, conflicts and environmental degradation (17); Fragile states: Wars fuelled by nationalism and extremist identity politics, and the associated dangers of mass murder and genocide, will be the core security challenge of the coming decades(17) ; Polycentrism will be accompanied by an economic power shift toward Asia (18); US and China will be the most influential actors; Polycentric world will generate a higher level of unpredictability in international relations, harder to attain a broad consensus even on matters requiring urgent global action (19); Devolution and diffusion of power (19); fifty greatest megacities in will concentrate more resources, will demand more autonomy and exert greater power, more prominent international role (19); Privatisation of central state functions may lead to breakdown of state structures (19);
Societal Challenges:
extremist identity politics and xenophobia will continue to leave a mark on some parts of the world. Likewise, the refusal of the right to cultural and religious freedom may promote radicalisation and the rise of nationalism in some areas of the globe (13); increased civil society pressure for direct participation in the political arena, in which the central influence of traditional party politics and governance structures will tend to wane (14); threaten representative institutions and democratic political parties, and open the way for new forms of radical populism (14); Corruption will severely hamper sustainable development, constituting one of the main hindrances to social inclusion(15);
Societal Challenges Shortlist:
extremist identity politics and xenophobia(13); refusal of the right to cultural and religious freedom may promote radicalisation and the rise of nationalism in some areas of the globe (13); increased civil society pressure for direct participation in the political arena(13); central influence of traditional party politics and governance structures will tend
to wane (14); new forms of radical populism (14); Corruption will severely hamper sustainable development, constituting one of the main hindrances to social inclusion(15); Improving the position of women will also diminish poverty aroung the world (74);
to wane (14); new forms of radical populism (14); Corruption will severely hamper sustainable development, constituting one of the main hindrances to social inclusion(15); Improving the position of women will also diminish poverty aroung the world (74);
Cross-cutting Challenges:
new information technologies will remain unavailable to many people (13); The convergence of concerns and increased vocalisation of demands will contrast sharply with governments’ capacity to deliver public goods, particularly those relating to improving quality of life. This will generate an expectations gap that may become a source of tension and social conflict (13); Resurgent nationalism will remain the most potent challenge to democracies around the world, and may cause societal fragmentation and conflict (14); because of illiteracy and lack of access to electricity; traditional media will be forced to adapt to ‘citizen journalism’ that makes use of social networks, blogs and websites (14); threats to privacy: internet companies are driven by economic interests, and citizens are therefore vulnerable to the abuse of stored information; cyber sphere is likely to become an arena of conflict and tension between states of all political stripes, not least among those for which cyber security is a key component of int elligence and military strategy, and also between individuals or private companies (15); cultural pluralism will also be challenged by extremism and xenophobia, which is likely to increase in societies with a shrinking middle class, where openness is perceived as a threat to well-being, or where governments use migrants as scapegoats for existing social problems.(45)
Cross-cutting Challenges Shortlist:
new information technologies will remain unavailable to many people (13); expectations gap that may become a source of tension and social conflict (13); Resurgent nationalism will remain the most potent challenge to democracies around the world, and may cause societal fragmentation and conflict (14); traditional media will be forced to adapt to ‘citizen journalism’ that makes use of social networks, blogs and websites (14); threats to
privacy: internet companies are driven by economic interests, and citizens are therefore vulnerable to the abuse of stored information; cyber sphere is likely to become an arena of conflict and tension between states of all political stripes(15); The expectations gap and the risk of extremism and nationalism (46); Demands for political participation but dangers of populism (49); A rising middle class but persistentpoverty and inequality (61); Shift of the configuration of the global working class with decline in many Western countries and Japan, and demographic growth Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (65); Economic volatility may lead natinals of developed countries to migrate and traditional host countries may turn into societies that export migrants (65);
privacy: internet companies are driven by economic interests, and citizens are therefore vulnerable to the abuse of stored information; cyber sphere is likely to become an arena of conflict and tension between states of all political stripes(15); The expectations gap and the risk of extremism and nationalism (46); Demands for political participation but dangers of populism (49); A rising middle class but persistentpoverty and inequality (61); Shift of the configuration of the global working class with decline in many Western countries and Japan, and demographic growth Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (65); Economic volatility may lead natinals of developed countries to migrate and traditional host countries may turn into societies that export migrants (65);
Summary of relevant aspects
Other Aspects of Governance:
new models of international governance beyond state/national powers; private initiatives; increasing pressure to reform multilateral institutions to reflect shifting power relations, including a drive towards greater inclusiveness (20);
Background information:
The EUISS, in its role as the European agency for strategic studies, was identified as the core institution of the trend-monitoring European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), which is steered by a ‘quadrilateral’ inter-institutional task force, composedby the Bureau of European Policy Advisers (BEPA), the European Parliament (EP), the Council of the European Union and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The eventual aim is to build a permanent EU forecasting capacity based on an inter-institutional and international network. The 2010 European Union Budget provided for the European Commission to undertake a Pilot Project over two years, with the aim of exploring the possibility of establishing ‘an inter-institutional system identifying long-term trends on major policy issues facing the EU’.
This Pilot Project was proposed by the Parliament and adopted jointly with the Council, as the twin arm of the budgetary authority. The EUISS report raises a wide range of issues. Its aim was not to predict exactly how theworld will look in 2030, but rather to map major, existing trends that are likely to shape the future and will need to be taken into account by the Union as it defines coherent strategic options for the next governance cycle.
This Pilot Project was proposed by the Parliament and adopted jointly with the Council, as the twin arm of the budgetary authority. The EUISS report raises a wide range of issues. Its aim was not to predict exactly how theworld will look in 2030, but rather to map major, existing trends that are likely to shape the future and will need to be taken into account by the Union as it defines coherent strategic options for the next governance cycle.
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