VERA – Forward Visions on the European Research Area

VERA is funded by the European Union's FP7 programme for research,
technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 290705

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World

Code: E02

Primary project information

Lead: US National Intelligence Council
Additional project partners: Atlantic Council of the Unite States, Stimson Center, SRI Consulting Business Intelligence; PFC Energy International, Evian Group at IMD, Monitor Group's Global Business Network, Long Term Strategy Group, Wilson Center, RAND, Council on Foreign Relations, Brookings, AEI, Texas A&M University, Indiana University, Chatham House London, Woodrow Wilson School, C CR Beijing, SIPRI Stockholm, US State Departments's Bureau of Intelligenca and Research, NSA, Toffler Associates
Type of activity: scenarios & seminars with a community of experts (US and foreign)
Date conducted: 2008
Date of Publication: 2008
Duration: 1 YEAR
Summary: 2025—What Kind of Future?
The trends identified in this report suggest major discontinuities, shocks, and surprises. Examples include nuclear weapons use or a pandemic. In some cases, the surprise element is only a matter of timing: an energy transition, for example is depicted as inevitable; the only questions are when and how abruptly or smoothly such a transition occurs. An energy transition from one type of fuel (fossil fuels) to another (alternative) is an event that historically has only happened once a century at most with momentous consequences. A transition—particularly an abrupt one—out of fossil fuels would have major repercussions for energy producers in the Middle East and Eurasia, potentially causing permanent decline of some states as global and regional powers. Other discontinuities are less predictable. They are likely to result from an interaction of several trends and depend on the quality of leadership:uncertainties such as whether China or Russia becomes a democracy. China’s growing middle class increases thechances but does not make such a development inevitable. Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in the absence of economic diversification. Pressure from below may force the issue, or a leader might begin or enhance the democratization process to sustain the economy or spur economic growth. A sustained plunge in the price of oil and gas would alter the outlook and increase prospects for greater political and economic liberalization in Russia. If either country were to democratize, it would represent another wave of democratization with wide significance for many other developing states. Also uncertain are the outcomes of demographic challenges facing Europe, Japan, and even Russia. In none of these cases does demography have to spell destiny with less regional and global power an inevitable outcome. Technology, the role of immigration, public health improvements, and laws encouraging greater female participation in the economy are some of the measures that could change the trajectory of current trends pointing toward less economic growth, increased social tensions, and possible decline. Whether global institutions adapt and revive—another key uncertainty—also is a function of leadership. Current trends suggest a dispersion of power and authority will create a global governance deficit. Reversing those trend lines would require strong leadership in the international community by a number of powers, including the emerging ones. Some uncertainties would have greater consequences—should they occur — than would others.This work emphasizs the overall potential for greater conflict—some forms of which could threaten globalization: WMD terrorism, aMiddle East nuclear arms race. Four fictionalized scenarios highlight new challenges that could emerge as a result of the ongoing global transformation. They present new situations, dilemmas, or predicaments that represent departures from recent developments.
Financed by: US National Intelligence Council
Budget: N/A
Research area/market/industry/sector: health, food & agriculture, energy, transport, climate change &
resources and societies.
Main report (full title): Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World

GRAND CHALLENGES

Economic Challenges: New mulit-polarity driven by globalizing economy is prone to shock of all kinds, creating pressures for rebalancing that are painful for rich and poor countries. (p.7) China and India: the future economic giants t the expenses of the US and EU.Growing Middle Class world wide but Sub Saharan Africa cannot enter the globalization game (p.8). State Capitalism: A non-Democratic Marketplace Rising in the East: Wealth is moving more under state control (p.8). Difficulties to rebalance financial markets due to uncoordinated action in etablished and emerging economies.(p.11) Multiple Financial Nodes all over the world ans spill over into other areas of power (p.13) Chinese state-capitalism and Islamic economic growth as alternative growth models to democratic liberalism. (p.13)
Economic Challenges Shortlist: Shocks to society due to multi-polarity and driven by globalizing economy; Redistribution of economic power in direction of China and India, on expenses of the US and the EU; Sub Saharan Africa remains excluded from the globalization game; Difficulties to rebalance financial markets due to uncoordinated action in established and emerging economies; Alternative growth models to democratic liberarlism model;
Geopolitical Challenges: Korean confederation by 2025 (p.62). Growing Risk of a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East triggerd by Iran's rise to a nuclear power (p.61).Shortage of Resources will lead to interstate conflicts (p.63). Terrorism: the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world's most dangerous capabilities within their reach (p.68).Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq: Local Trajectories and Outside Interests, prone to tribal and sectarian disputes (p.72). New rising powers in the Muslim world (p.29). China - a new military competitor for the US (P.29). Social pressures and turmoil within China ('perfect storm') (p.29). Up-and-Coming Muslim Powers: Iran, Turkey, Indonesia - models for other rapidly modernizing countries? (p.36). Will Although states will not disappear from the international scene, the relative power of various non-state actors - corporations, tribes, religious organizations, even criminal networks - will grow as these groups influence decisions on a widening range of social, economic, and political issues (p.81). Traditional US allies, particularly Israel and Japan, could come to feel less secure in 2025 than they do today as a result of emerging unfavorable demographic trends within their respective countries, resource scarcities, and more intensive military competitions in the Middle East and East Asia, specially if there is also doubt about the vitality of US security guarantees.(p.97)
Geopolitical Challenges Shortlist: Growing Risk of a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East triggerd by Iran's rise to a nuclear power; Interstate conflicts due to resource shortages; Growing capabilities of terrorist organisations due to diffusion of scientific knowledge and access to technologies; Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq: Local Trajectories and Outside Interests, prone to tribal and sectarian disputes; Rising (military) powers in the Middle East and Asia; Social pressures and turmoil within China ('perfect storm'); Up-and-Coming Muslim Powers: Iran, Turkey, Indonesia - models for other rapidly modernizing countries?; Growing relative power of various non-state actors (corporations, tribes, religious organizations, criminal networks) on a widening range of social, economic, and political issues; Rising doubts about the vitality of US security guarantees; Waning sense of security of traditional US allies as a result of emerging unfavorable demographic trends within their respective countries, resource scarcities, and more intensive military competitions in the Middle East and East Asia
Societal Challenges: Populations Growing (Sub-Saharn Africa, india, China), Declining (Europe, Japan), and Diversifying—at the Same Time (p.19) The Pensioner Boom: Challenges of Aging Populations and high pressure on the working population. (p.21) Persistent Youth Bulgeswill increase migration and externalize volatility and violence. (p.22) Changing Places: Migration, Urbanization, and Ethnic Shifts: 7 out of 8 new megacities in the Sub-Saharan; Europe and US competing for the best brains with China, India, Turkey, Iran (p.23). Ethnic shift putting pressure on Middle East (p.24). Economic setbacks could enhance prospects for movement toward pluralism and greater democratization (in China and Russia) (p.87). Widespread corruption undermines faith in democratic institutions (p.87). Better economic performance of many authoritarian governments could sow doubt among some about democracy as the best form of government (p.87). With energy supplies increasingly concentrated in countries with poor governance, longstanding practices of corruption, and and absence of the rule of law, the potential for penetration by organized crime is high (p.88).
Societal Challenges Shortlist: Demographic changes: Growing populations (Sub-Saharan Africa, India, China), declining populations (Europe, Japan) - and diversification, all at the same time; Challenges of ageing populations; Increasing migration, volatility and violance among the youth; 7 out of 8 new megacities in the Sub-Saharan; Europe and US competing for the best brains with China, India, Turkey, Iran; Loss of faith in democratic institutions due to widespread corruption; Growing doubts about democracy as best form of governance because of better economic performances of authoritarian governments; Concentration of energy supplies in countries with poor governance, longstanding practices of corruption, and and absence of the rule of law; high potential for organized crime in energy supplying countries with poor governance, corruption, and absence of rule of law
Technical Challenges: New drilling technologies my help exploit previously unexplored oil fields in areas of contested ownership (Arctic, Asia)(p.63);
Technical Challenges Shortlist: Conflicts in ares of contested ownership (Arctic, Asia), when new drilling technologies enable exploitation of previously unexplored oil fields;

Summary of relevant aspects

Connecting fields: Food and water also are intertwined with climate change, energy, and demography. Rising energy prices increase the cost for consumers and the environment of industrialscale agriculture and application of petrochemical fertilizers. A switch from use of arable land for food to fuel crops provides a limited solution and could exacerbate both the energy and food situations. Climatically, rainfall anomalies and constricted seasonal flows of snow and glacial melts are aggravating water scarcities, harming agriculture in many parts of the globe. Energy and climate dynamics also combine to amplify a number of other ills such as health problems, agricultural losses to pests, and storm damage. The greatest danger may arise from the convergence and interaction of many stresses simultaneously. (p.41)
Surprising Issues: Europe plays a marginal role from US perspective. Lots of emphasis on the future role of Russia, China, India and the deprived Sub-Saharan area. Lots of very interesting global challenges!
Background information: out FinnSight 2015, a joint foresight exercise that would provide inputs to this strategy, foster collaboration between these funding

Scenarios

Scenarios: Global Scenario I: A World Without the West: the new powers supplant the West as the leaders on the world stage. In this world, described in a fictional letter from a future head of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), new powers supplant the West as the leaders on the world stage. The US feels overburdened and withdraws from Central Asia, including Afghanistan; Europe will not step up to the plate and take the lead.
Russia, China, and others are forced to deal with the potential for spillover and instability in Central Asia. The SCO gains ascendance while NATO’s status declines. Anti-China antagonism in the US and Europe reaches a crescendo; protectionist trade barriers are put in place. Russia and China enter a marriage of convenience; other countries—India and Iran—rally around them. The lack of any stable bloc—whether in the West or the non-Western world—adds to growing instability and disorder, potentially threatening globalization. (p.4)
Scenario 1: Global Scenario II: October Surprise: illustrates the impact of inattention to global climate change; unexpected major impacts narrow the world’s range of options. In this world, depicted in a diary entry of a future US President, many countries have been preoccupied with achieving economic growth at the expense of safeguarding the environment. The scientific community has not been able to issue specific warnings, but worries increase that a tipping point has been reached in which climate change has accelerated and possible impacts will be very destructive. New York City is hit by a major hurricane linked to global climate change; the NY Stock Exchange is severely damaged and, in the face of such destruction, world leaders must begin to think about taking drastic measures, such as relocating parts of coastal cities.
Scenario 2: Global Scenario III: BRICs’ Bust-Up: illustrates the impact of inattention to global climate change; unexpected major impacts narrow the world’s range of options. In this world, conflict breaks out between China and India over access to vital resources. Outside powersintervene before the conflict escalates and expands into a global conflagration. The clash is triggered by Chinese suspicion of efforts by others to threaten Beijing’s energy supplies. Misperceptions and miscalculations lead to the clash. The scenario highlights the importance of energy and other resources to continued growth and development as a great power. It shows the extent to which conflict in a multipolar world is just as likely to occur between rising states as between older and newer powers. (p.4)
Scenario 3: Global Scenario IV: Politics is Not Always Local: nonstate networks emerge to set the international agenda on the environment, eclipsing governments. In this world, outlined in an article by a fictional Financial Times reporter, various nonstate networks— NGOs, religious groups, business leaders, and local activists—combine to set the international agenda on the environment and use their clout to elect the UN Secretary General. The global politica coalition of nonstate actors plays a crucial role in securing a new worldwide climate change agreement. In this new connected world of digital communications, growing middle classes, and transnational interest groups,politic is no longer local and domestic and international agendas become increasingly interchangeable. (p.4)
Who benefits from the actions taken?: N/A

Meta information

Time horizon: 2025
Methods: scenarios & seminars with a community of experts (US and foreign)
Target Group: primarily US Policy makers (security strategy, meta level)
Objectives: to stimulate strategic thinking about the future by identifying key trends, the factors that drive them, where they seem to be headed, and how they might interact. the study seeks to help readers to recognize signposts indicating where events are headed and to identify opportunities for policy intervention to change or lock in the trajectories of specific developments. Among the messages we hope to convey are: “If you like where events seem to be headed, you may want to take timely action to preserve their positive trajectory. If you do not like where they appear to be going, you will have to develop and implement policies to change their trajectory.” An even more important message is that leadership matters, no trends are immutable, and that timely and well-informed intervention can decrease the likelihood and severity of negative developments and increase the likelihood of positive ones.
Countries covered: Global (but mustly member countries of World Economic Forum); specific focus on Japan; other: industrialized countries, NIC
ERA actors/stakeholders mentioned: Mathew Burrows; C. Thomas Fingar Chairman, National Intelligence Council; The Atlantic Council of the United States and the Stimson Center. Dr. William Ralston, Dr. Nick Evans and their team at SRI Consulting Business Intelligence. Dr. Alexander Van de Putte of PFC Energy International. Professor Jean-Pierre Lehmann of the Evian Group at IMD in Lausanne. Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall at the Monitor Group’s Global Business Network in San Francisco. Professor Barry Hughes of the University of Denver. Dr. Jacqueline Newmyer and Dr. Stephen Rosen from the Long Term Strategy Group. Dr. Geoff Dabelko at the Wilson Center; Dr. Greg Treverton of RAND; Sebastian Mallaby at the Council on Foreign Relations; Carlos Pascual at Brookings; Dr. Michael Auslin at AEI; Professor Christopher Layne at Texas A&M University; Professor Sumit Ganguly at Indiana University and Dr. Robin Niblett and Jonathan Paris at Chatham House in London. Professor John Ikenberry from Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School. Professor Lanxin Xiang by CICIR in Beijing. Dr. Bates Gill at SIPRI in Stockholm. Julianne Paunescu from theState Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). Marilyn Maines and her experts at NSA.
Geographic scope:

Entry Details

Rapporteur: Susanne Giesecke
Rapporteur's organization: AIT
Entry Date: 03.04.2012